文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：地方上市公司数量、产权影响与政府的扶持之手

英文题名：The Number of Regional Listed Companies,the property and Supporting Hand of Government

作者：鄢波[1,2];王华[1];杜勇[3]

机构：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632;[2]广东海洋大学经管学院,广东湛江524000;[3]西南大学经济管理学院,重庆400715

年份：2014

卷号：40

期号：7

起止页码：164

中文期刊名：经济管理

外文期刊名：Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

收录：CSTPCD、、北大核心2011、国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库、CSSCI2014_2016、北大核心、社科基金资助期刊、CSSCI

基金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目"公司治理效率;亏损扭转度与亏损公司价值"(11YJC630243);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目"亏损逆转性在大股东异质对公司价值驱动过程中的中介效应研究"(12YJC630010);国家社会科学基金项目"亏损上市公司治理效率与扭亏行为的市场反应研究"(13CGL050)

语种：中文

中文关键词：政府补助;扭亏;地方上市公司数量;产权性质

外文关键词：government subsidy; loss reversals; the number of regional listed companies; property

中文摘要：基于目前广泛存在的政府补助作为"支持之手"帮助财务困境企业"扭亏保牌"避免退市的行为,本文从"扭亏保牌"动机的政府补助效应出发,探讨了地方上市公司数量、产权因素对政府补助的影响。研究发现,有扭亏动机或者保牌动机的企业都能获得更多政府补助,并且无论产权性质是否国有,扭亏保牌动机的政府补贴效应都显著存在。进一步检验发现,地方上市公司的数量显著地影响了非国有企业的政府补助,并且对保牌动机的政府补助效应有显著的调节作用,对于扭亏动机的政府补助效应则不存在显著的影响。研究结果表明,政府的扶持之手受到地方政府"壳"资源的数量和产权性质的影响,反映出政府补助决策的权变特征。本文的研究在一定程度上拓展了政企关系的研究视野,为政府干预行为的治理提供了经验证据的支持。

外文摘要：Since China＇s fiscal decentralization reform, Financial ability of local government rose with the financial autonomy improvement. The ability of local government subsidies to enterprises is improved as Financial ability of local government improved. Local government subsidies cover more and more widely, subsidies is also rising year by year. According to figures released by 2012 annual report of listed companies ,more than 70% of the listed com panies received government subsidies, and Petrochina obtain 9. 406 billion yuan of govemment subsidies to become the king. It can be found many listed companies turn a profit from loss relying on the government subsidies successfully,including Datang Telecom, Macao Ocean Science and technology, Chenming paper listed companies. At the same time, it is frequent exposed that the enterprise defrauding subsidy by the media, the appropriateness and ne cessity of government subsidies are in doubt by the public in the face of a series defrauding facts. Government sub sidies is a direct means of intervention in the economy by government, and it is the supporting hand of Government, it caused the extensive attention and discussing by the public. Therefore, it is necessary to research in the motiva tion of local government subsidies behavior and indepth discussion on the economic consequences. In the research literature about government subsidies, A large number of literatures researched on the motives of government subsidies and the economic consequences, and tested the consistency of them （ Chen Xiao ＆ Li Jing （2001）, Chen Donghua （2003）, Tang Qingquanet al. （2007）, Pan Yue et al. （2009） ,Zhu Song ＆ Chen Yunsen （2009）, Guo Jianhua et al. （2011） and Yu Minggui et al. （2010））. They found that the motivation of govern ment subsidies is diversiform, there are the economic interests and the social motivation. The government subsidy did not always bring more and better long term economic benefits. More than previous research analysis the motiva tion of local government subsidies from the angle of the subsidy objects, few literature discuss the motivation of local government subsidies from the external environment factors of local government. Government subsidies decision, however, is not only influenced by the subsidy object, also by the external environment of local governments. Which the enterprise should get the subsidy, it is a the rational contingency decision of local government. Based on this, we will further reveal contingency characteristics of the government subsidies decisionmaking. We choose the listed companies as samples over the 2002 to2011 period. Firstly, we examined the difference of the government subsidies between profits and losses listed companies of listed companies ,focusing on the loss rever sal motives of government subsidies and avoiding delisting motives ; Secondly, we divided the sample into two groups according property rights of the actual controller to examine the differences influence to the subsides by the property nature ; Finally,we used the number of regional listed companies as a proxy variable to reflect the local government external resource constraints, and tested its impact on the behavior of government subsidies. We found that the loss reversal motives and the voiding delisting motives of government subsidies existed property, the number of listed companies influence on the behavior of government s regardless of the nature of the ubsidy only significantly in non state enterprises samples. With further inspection, we found the local government would consider its own resource constraints when give subsidy to the nonstate and continuous loss enterprises which is on the verge of delisting. The more regional listed companies, the weaker subsidy motives. The phenomenon was not obviously exist to turnaround motivation of government subsidy. Research results showed that the government＇s supporting hands were different fa cing to the different losses, property rights, and the resource constraints of local government. The contribution of this paper lies in ： （ 1 ） we subdivided the earnings management motivation of government subsidies, and redefined the loss reversal motives of government subsidy and the avoiding delisting motives according to the background of China＇s capital market delisting policy. Our conclusion is more reliable with controlling the en vironmental factors and other government subsidies motivation, （2） we used the the number of listed companies to reflect the size of the resource constraints of local government, and test the external factors that affect the behavior of government subsidies. This paper enriched the research on government subsidies motivation of literature. The re sults provide a basis experience in how to standardize the behavior of government subsidy.