文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：制度供给与第一书记参与基层治理的行为困境——基于广东调研实例及演化博弈分析

英文题名：Institutional Supply and the Behavioral Dilemma of First Secretary’s Participation in Grassroots Governance:Based on Guangdong Research Example and Evolutionary Game Analysis

作者：蒋重秀[1];蒋文杰[1]

机构：[1]广东海洋大学经济学院,广东湛江524000

年份：2023

卷号：42

期号：6

起止页码：14

中文期刊名：重庆文理学院学报（社会科学版）

外文期刊名：Journal of Chongqing University of Arts and Sciences（Social Sciences Edition)

收录：国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库

基金：广东省科技创新战略专项资金资助项目“粤西地区乡村振兴带头人的能力模型构建和配置机制创新研究——以遂城镇为例”(pdjh2022b0245)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：制度供给;第一书记;驻村干部;演化博弈

外文关键词：institutional supply;first secretary;resident cadres;evolutionary game

中文摘要：第一书记群体作为基层治理中政府下派的外生治理力量,在与上级政府的互动中表现出明显的“委托-代理”关系,双方在乡村振兴的工作中呈现出明显的博弈倾向。文章引入广东省S市Q区的驻镇帮镇扶村工作的调研实例,分析上级政府和第一书记的成本收益,通过构建演化博弈模型,分析不完全信息条件下上级政府和第一书记在乡村振兴工作中的博弈过程,通过模拟仿真分析和敏感度分析,结果表明:博弈双方的行为选择均受到行为成本和博弈对手行为选择的双重约束,二者存在最优组合策略;上级政府的有效制度供给对引导第一书记积极履职有明显作用;政府与驻村干部因制度成本和工作性质有较高可能倾向于追求基本收益的满足;驻村干部的工作性质难以通过激励约束引导行为偏好,其超额收益的获得取决于主观价值的实现。

外文摘要：As an exogenous governance force assigned by the government in grassroots governance,the group of first secretaries shows an obvious principal-agent relationship in their interaction with the higher-level government,and the two parties present obvious game tendencies in the work of rural revitalization.By introducing a research example of helping a town to help a village in Q district of S city,Guangdong province,an analysis was made on the cost-benefit of the higher-level government and the first secretary,and the game process between the higher-level government and the first secretary in rural revitalization work under the condition of incomplete information by constructing an evolutionary game model.The effective institutional supply of the higher-level government has an obvious role in guiding the first secretary to perform his duties actively;the government and the resident cadres have a higher tendency to pursue the satisfaction of basic benefits due to institutional costs and the nature of their work;the nature of the work of the resident cadres makes it difficult to guide behavioral preferences through incentive constraints,and the acquisition of their excess benefits depends on the realization of subjective values.