文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：信息不对称、激励与税收征管

英文题名：Asymmetric Information,Incentives and Tax Administration

作者：杨得前[1]

机构：[1]广东海洋大学经管学院,广东湛江524088

年份：2007

期号：2

起止页码：71

中文期刊名：税务与经济

外文期刊名：Taxation and Economy

收录：人大复印报刊资料、CSTPCD、、CSSCI2006_2007、北大核心2004、北大核心、CSSCI

基金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371070);上海市重点学科建设资助项目(TD502)

语种：中文

中文关键词：信息不对称;纳税人;税务机关;逆向选择

外文关键词：asymmetric information ; taxpayer; tax authority ; adverse selection

中文摘要：税务机关与纳税人之间的信息不对称造成的影响:其一,造成了纳税人的逆向选择;其二,造成了税制的扭曲;其三,加大了税收的征收成本。应采取有力的政策措施减少纳税人与税务机关之间的信息不对称。在信息不对称条件下关联博弈和重复博弈可以有效地激励纳税人诚实纳税。

外文摘要：The paper firstly analyzes the influence which asymmetric information between taxpayers and the tax authority produces. It results in adverse selection, distortion of the tax system and increase of tax collection cost. Secondly, the policies for reducing asymmetric information between taxpayers and the tax authority were put forward. Lastly, the paper points out that associated game and repeated game can effectively impel the taxpayers to pay taxes honestly.