文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Role of value signals in information asymmetry markets

作者：Ke, Da[1];Li, Xuan[1];Zheng, Qing[2]

机构：[1]Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430070, Hubei, Peoples R China;[2]Guangdong Ocean Univ, Sch Management, Zhanjiang 524088, Peoples R China

年份：2025

卷号：72

外文期刊名：FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS

收录：SSCI(收录号：WOS:001373535100001)、、Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85210768425)、WOS

语种：英文

外文关键词：Information asymmetry markets; Value signal; Online auctions; Consumer economics: theory

外文摘要：The second-hand car online auction market demonstrates how value signals influence bidders in information asymmetry markets. Appraised value and starting price serve as value signals, similar to list prices in traditional sales. To facilitate comparisons of items with varying appraised value, we replace starting price and final price with relative values based on appraised value. Our study described differences among different appraised value. The results indicate number of bidders positively influences relative starting price and total price increments while starting price positively moderates this influence, both varying across appraised value levels. Our research reduces market imbalance while revealing the relationship between appraised value and starting price in the second-hand car market.