文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：基于演化博弈的中日渔业资源争端及其合作探析

英文题名：Analysis of Sino-Japanese fishery resources disputes and cooperation based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

作者：白福臣[1];张苇锟[2];宁凌[2]

机构：[1]广东海洋大学经济学院/海洋经济与管理研究中心;[2]广东海洋大学管理学院/东盟研究院

年份：2017

卷号：0

期号：2

起止页码：100

中文期刊名：世界农业

外文期刊名：World Agriculture

收录：北大核心2014、国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库、北大核心

语种：中文

中文关键词：中国;日本;渔业资源;演化博弈

中文摘要：中国与日本自1955年签订《中日渔业协定》,特别在两国批准加入《联合国海洋法公约》后,双方搁置争议,强化合作。伴随《中日渔业协定》遗留的问题凸显,中日渔业资源争端开始持续升温。中日较量实质是反复动态演化博弈,构建双方演化博弈模型,分析中日行为策略选择倾向。结果表明,双方的期望收益是影响演化稳定均衡的主要因素,而双方的初始博弈决定着各自演化路径。从长远看,中日双方在渔业资源较量中会演化成共同合作的稳定均衡策略。为此,中日需在原《中日渔业协定》的基础上完善双方合作机制,以此改变双方博弈参数值,推进中日邦交合作无间。

外文摘要：China and Japan signing the 'Sino-Japanese fisheries agreement'since 1955,especially after the two countries ratified the Convention,and the two sides put aside dispute and strengthen cooperation.With the legacy of the issues from 'Sino-Japanese fisheries agreement'highlighted,the Sino-Japanese dispute began to heat up fisheries resources.The essence of the competition between China and Japan is repeated dynamic evolutionary game,with the two sides of the evolutionary game model constructed,analyzing the tendency of Japan's behavior strategy selection.The results indicate that the expected return is the main factor that affects the evolutionary stable equilibrium,and the initial game decides the evolution path.In the long run,the two sides will evolve into a stable and balanced strategy on the competition of fisheries resources.Therefore,Sino-Japanese need to improve the mechanism of cooperation in the original'Sino Japanese fisheries agreement',in order to promot the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.