文献类型：会议论文

英文题名：Controlling shareholder and agency problems in China's private listed companies: Evidence from CEO turnover

作者：Fan Ronghui[1,2];Liu Erli[3]

机构：[1]South China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou 510640, Guangdong, Peoples R China;[2]Shanxi Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Taiyuan 030006, Shanxi, Peoples R China;[3]Guangdong Ocean Univ, Coll Econ & Management, Guangzhou 524088, Guangdong, Peoples R China

会议论文集：International Conference on Management and Technology

会议日期：OCT 13, 2007

会议地点：Taiyuan, PEOPLES R CHINA

语种：英文

外文关键词：controlling shareholder; agency problems; private listed companies; CEO turnover

外文摘要：Type I and type II agency problems more or less exist in modem corporations. The former arises from the conflicting interests between managers and shareholders, while the latter results from the inconsistent benefits between large shareholders and minority ones. Does controlling shareholders contribute to the solution of agency problems? Using unique data on China's private listed firms from 2002 to 2005, we find that the answer depends on the fraction of shares held by firm's dominant owner because it have different effects on the two types of agency problems. While the minority-controlled shareholders tend to deteriorate them, the majority-controlled shareholders incline to ameliorate them. It provides direct evidence that shareholdings concentrate in founding families seems reasonable when firms operate in a country characterized by low legal protection for investors.